

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

EXCISE

82

39-32

CONFIDENTIAL

Action
EUR

Control: 2873
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 8, 1962
12:28 PM

FROM: PARIS

Info
SS

TO: Secretary of State

SAL

BTF

ARA

LC

DOC

P

USA

NSC

INR

CLIA

NSA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

NIC

RMR

NO: 2052, NOVEMBER 8, 4 PM
ACTION DEPARTMENT 2052, INFORMATION MOSCOW 44.

A FRENCH CORRESPONDENT, FLUENT IN RUSSIAN, TOLD ME OF A LUNCH HE HAD YESTERDAY WITH YURI ZHUKOV WHO HAD JUST RETURNED FROM THE UNITED STATES. THIS CORRESPONDENT WHO HAS KNOWN ZHUKOV FOR FIFTEEN YEARS TOLD ME THAT ZHUKOV HAD BEEN EXTREMELY IMPRESSED WITH THE ATMOSPHERE HE HAD FOUND IN WASHINGTON. HE MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS IN REGARD TO THE CUBAN SITUATION:

1. ZHUKOV FELT THAT THE RECENT CONFRONTATION HAD INDICATED THAT AN ATOMIC WAR WAS "IMPOSSIBLE" AND THAT BECAUSE OF CUBAN EVENTS WAS MUCH LESS LIKELY THAN BEFORE.

2. HE THOUGHT THAT BEFORE TOO LONG AFTER THE CUBAN AFFAIR WAS SETTLED THERE WOULD PROBABLY BE A SOVIET MOVE FOR A SUMMIT.

3. HE SAID THAT IN THE SOVIET VIEW WAR HAD BEEN NARROWLY AVERTED AND DESCRIBED THE SEQUENCE WHICH COULD HAVE LED TO SUCH AN EVENTUALITY AS FOLLOWS: A) US BOMBARDMENT OF CUBA; B) CUBAN RESISTANCE; C) AMERICAN INVASION; D) SOVIET ASSISTANCE (THIS SEEMS TO BE A SOVIET EXPLANATION AFTER THE EVENT RATHER THAN ANY HARD INFORMATION.)

4. ON THE SUBJECT OF BERLIN HE SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD PROCEED VERY CAUTIOUSLY BUT OFFERED AS A PERSONAL OPINION A POSSIBLE SOLUTION BY THE TRANSFERANCE OF UN HEADQUARTERS TO BERLIN IN WHICH CASE HE SAID THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM ABOUT ARRANGING AN INTERNATIONAL ACCESS AUTHORITY FOR WEST BERLIN. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE POSSIBILITIES OF A TEST BAN AGREEMENT WERE QUITE GOOD AT THE PRESENT TIME SINCE THE DIFFERENCES WERE RELATIVELY NARROW.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MB

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REVIEWED by *Blakely*

DATE *3/6/88*

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() DENY () Non-responsive info

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MB

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REVIEWED by *Blakely*

DATE *10/10/94*

CLASSTED BY:

TS authority to:

QA/DR

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-2- 2052, NOVEMBER 8, 4 PM: FROM PARIS

THE CORRESPONDENT SAID THAT IT WAS NOTICEABLE DURING THIS CONVERSATION THAT ZHOKOV, IN CONTRAST TO PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM, HAD MADE NO MENTION OF THE NAME OF KHRUSHCHEV AT ANY TIME. I SERIOUSLY DOUBT IF ZHUKOV HAD ANY REAL CONGNIZANCE OF THE SOVIET POLICY BUT AM REPORTING THIS AS AN INDICATION OF THE WAY SOME SECOND LEVEL SOVIET OFFICIALS SEEM TO BE THINKING.

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BOHLEN

JTC

EXCISED COPY FOLLOWS

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EVIDENCED BY *John M. K.*

DATE *3/2/68*

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TS authority to:

CLASSIFY BY *John M. K.* OADR

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